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1 
Introduction 
almost any available metric, there is a wide gap the economic 
'-''"'"uu.., ... ifortunes of the Middle East and the West.1 Even after account-
which a small of Middle HC>C"t"' ... "'"' ... "' 
Westerners are on average about six times They can also 
to on average, eight years and have nearly twice the edu-
cation (see Table 1.1). One cause - and consequence of Middle Eastern 
economic retardation is poor governance and violence. The average H"u-.. .... "L..., 
Easterner lives in a much more and autocratic state and is sub-
to much more civil ethnic violence the average Westerner. 
is the primary reason for the tensions between 
the Middle East and of the rest and it is at the root of the 
Islamists. 
Middle East - indeed, the West and 
"'"' 1 ''"'°'~,-,,,u recent In the 
trial period, Western Europe was not obviously of the rest of the 
and it was not so far ahead of the East that the Ottoman 
HrY"''"'"'"' (the leading Middle Eastern state) felt economically or V'VU"~L~~u~ 
lnt".c>t'H'\"I" Over time, a vast and "'""'""'"'~'"·mT 
""1'">'1'"""'y"'" between the two. This to dominate 
the rest of the world economically and politically, a fact most clearly mani-
in their colonization of a large portion of the world's inhabitable land. 
Meanwhile, by the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was considered 
the "sick man of Europe" - a once mighty on its final legs. The lead-
Western European powers carved up the Middle East into 
states with artificial boundaries that suited geopolitical 
It is undeniable that the fortunes of the Middle East diverged 
from those of the West. But what caused this The difference in 
fortunes is more puzzling than it might seem from a twenty-first-century 
2 
Table 1.1 Economic and Political Health, the "West" and Middle East/North 
Africa (MENA), 2012-2014 (weighted 
The "West" MENA Interpretation/Notes 
Per Capita GDP $48,269 $8,009 In 2013 US 
Dollars 
Life Expectancy 80.4 72.6 2013 Life 
Expectancy at 
birth 
Mean Years of 12.l 6.8 2012 data 
Schooling 
State Fragility 1.42 11.11 0--25 is most 
fragile) 
Civil and Ethnic 0.00 1.03 0-10 (10 is most 
Violence/War violent) 
Autocracy 0.00 3.58 0-10 (10 is most 
autocratic) 
Sources: GDP World Bank (2014); Schooling- UN Development Program (2014); State Fragility, 
Violence, Autocracy- Marshall and Cole (2014); Population CIA World Factbook (2014); all data 
weighted by 2014 population; GDP and Fragility are in 2013; Violence and Autocracy are in 2014. 
Western Europe includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United and the United States. 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, West Bank & Gaza, and Yemen. 
For most of the last or two, Westerners had more 
contact with Middle Easterners than they did with the rest of the world. 
between Western Europe and the Middle East 
"''"'"''·UJ'"'"'" more than it did between Western Europe and the 
world. The similarities between the two regions and their rela-
tive make the relative success of the West even more mysteri-
ous: What allowed Western economies to succeed where Middle Eastern 
ones stagnated? 
This is the question addressed in this book. At its core, this book is about 
why some economies succeed and others stagnate. It is tempting to ask 
whether Islam is to for the relative poverty and poor governance of 
the Middle East. It is to avoid question, even if it may be 
offensive to some; it is simply bad science to a hypothesis because it 
is offensive. And is reason not to dismiss this possibility offhand. The 
famed scholar of Islamic history Bernard Lewis seemed to suggest just this 
late in his career,2 and there is a long Orientalist tradition ascribing bad 
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consequences to Islamic doctrine and practice. This is also a common trope 
of the Western media, associations between Islam and 
"bad" socio-political-economic events are all too common. Even if most 
stories in the media are easy to dismiss upon only slightly deeper 
tion, it is not so easy to dismiss the more intelligently construed arguments 
of the Orientalists. Lewis and others knew a lot about the Middle East and 
Islamic history. And indeed, Islam harbors numerous rules relevant for 
trade and governance. 
why isn't Islam to blame? The answer is even if one accepts 
the idea that religious doctrine matters for economic performance, the facts 
simply do not line up. The histories in the millennium 
to industrialization do not with the that Islam is to 
economic growth. The most important fact to account for in any theory 
the modern economy was born in Western not the Middle 
East is the East was ahead of Europe \;;\,,\JH\JU_1_,_..,a,_._. 
ically, and culturally for centuries following the 
through twelfth centuries, Islamic ~....-.-...... ""'""' uv.uuual-<;.-u 
Eurasia. For its first four or five centuries, Islam was ass-oc1tatE~ct 
economic growth. 
The uu-.-..1rinn1/1a U.l<>uivuuV-'-'-
centurieS ago than it is in the 
economies. Western ,__,.,._L...,,,_,~ 
populations were and science 
far other regions. almost any economic measure, the 
Middle East was of It had access to far more 
technology, its trade flowed in higher volumes and over 
it employed more instruments. There 
to this assertion. advances in math-
ematics, philosophy, art, were of the 
Islamic through the thirteenth The data are of course sparser 
the back in time one travels, but one indication in the pre-
modern setting for which we do have data is population size. Urban 
population works as a metric economic performance because 
urban populations meant there was enough food to people who 
were not producing for own sustenance, and urbanites generally pro-
duced and consumed the luxuries of life. In short, urban 
tions generally meant wealth. 3 
Urban population data confirms the suspected showing a slow 
but clear reversal of economic fortunes between Western Europe and the 
4 Rulers, Religion, and Riches 
800 C.E. 
Q Cities under Christian rule 
• Cities under Muslim rule 
Figure 1.1 Twenty Most Populous Cities in Europe and the Middle East, 800 CE 
Source: Bosker et al. (2013). 
Middle East over the last 1,200 years. 1.1 indicates that in 800, the 
urban share of the population of the Islamic world was much than 
in Christian Europe.4 Fourteen of the twenty-two largest cities in Europe 
and the Middle East, including by far the largest city - the Abbasid capi-
tal Baghdad - were under Islamic rule. The Umayyad (Cordoba) Caliphate 
in modern-day Spain and the Abbasid Caliphate, centered in modern-
day Iraq, ruled the most populous and wealthiest areas. Seven of the eight 
most populous cities were Muslim-ruled, with only the Byzantine capital 
Constantinople containing a large urban population of Christians. In fact, 
the combined population of the top thirteen cities of Christian Western and 
Central Europe (Naples, Rome, Verona, Regensburg, Metz, Paris, Speyer, 
Mainz, Reims, Tours, Cologne, Trier, and Lyon) was less than the popula-
tion of Baghdad in 800. 
Fast forward 500 years. The scene described in the preceding paragraphs 
certainly changed by 1300, but even so the Middle East was far from a lag-
gard, in spite of the decimation of some urban populations by the Mongols. 
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1300 C.E. 
Q Cities under Christian rule 
• Cities under Muslim rule 
1.2 Twenty Most Populous Cities in 
Source: Bosker et al. (2013). 
and the Middle East, 1300 CE 
in Italy, and many 
of Western were well on their way to recovery. 1.2 sug-
the balance of power between the Christian and Islamic worlds 
was more equal, with twelve of the cities ruled Christians 
·~~ ... ,,,,,~H the most populous The center of Hnl'·nn,p-:in 
was located in Italy - six of the twelve Christian cities were 
of those located in the wealthy northern 
especially Venice, and Florence, were among the wealthiest 
in the world, birthing many of modern banking, Hii•~AA-'~' 
accounting, and trade. Northwestern was only slightly wealthier in 
per capita terms in the early than the wealthiest Muslim 
(Egypt), while Italy was about twice as wealthy as any other of 
Western Europe, let alone the Middle East. 
By 1800, the reversal of fortunes was Seventeen of the 
most populous cities in the region were not only Christian but located in 
6 
1800 C.E. 
0 Cities under Christian rule 
• Cities under Muslim rule 
Figure 1.3 Twenty Most Populous Cities in 
Source: Bosker et al. (2013). 
and the Middle East, 1800 CE 
either Western or Central The Industrial Revolution had com-
menced in Great Britain, and the European powers had colonized much of 
the rest of the world. Real wages were much higher in northwestern Europe 
than they were in the wealthiest Muslim world. 6 The divergence 
was not solely between northwestern and the Middle East. By 
time, real wages between northwestern Europe and 
China, Japan, and India as well.7 
Figure 1.4 summarizes trend in economic fortunes. This 
presents the "urban center of gravity" of Western Eurasia each cen-
tury from 800 to 1800. is a metric of the average '"""'"'11,,,r1 
and latitude of the weighted by where urbanites lived. More popu-
lous areas "pulled" the center of gravity closer to themselves. The path 
in this figure is In 800, the urban center of Western Eurasia was 
just west of the Anatolian Peninsula. It was pulled strongly to the south-
east by the Abbasid Caliphate, which was centered in Iraq, while it was 
pulled south by the bustling urban areas of Egypt. The primary reason 
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in 1.1-1.4 are for rep1resentaticmal Europe is on a 
to accommo-tilt in this map relative to its conventional repiresentaticm in 
date the entire 
Source: Bosker et al. 
Abbasid was the presence of 
...... ..,.~_..._, ..... , in the Iberian Peninsula. Over the 
as the northern 
tenth century, and ulti-
"'1"'hr.0"'"'Th centuries 
grew relative 
urban center of Western Eurasia 
2,000 miles away 
about 500-600 miles 
Europe: London 
,,,...,..,., .. ~.,....,.,,,,." "'""~"'"'"'"T'".,._ of the reversal of fortunes must 
it must account for both rise 
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of the great Muslim empires as well as their relative stagnation. Second, 
although it is not clear from Figures 1.1-1.4, the modern economy was very 
much a product of northwestern Europe - England and, before that, the 
Netherlands. An understanding of where modern wealth comes from must 
therefore account for long-run differences both between Western Europe 
and the Middle East and within Western Europe. 
It is the purpose of this book to address these two issues within one con-
sistent framework. The framework eschews simplistic notions that Islam 
is at the root of the divergence or, on the contrary, that Catholicism or 
Protestantism are causes of European success. It does argue, however, that 
how political authorities used religion to legitimize their rule did matter, 
and the exact mapping from religion to legitimacy to economic outcomes is 
dependent on historical processes. 
~AALIV_._ ... ...,..,. ..... ...,,Jl ... "' and Limitations of the 
The consequences of this "long divergence;' as Timur Kuran has called it, 
are still with us in the twenty-first century. were not for the temporary 
shock of oil wealth, the Middle East would be one of the poorest places 
on earth, rivaled only by sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Southeast Asia. 
Historical curiosity should be enough to warrant an investigation into how 
this region - once the wealthiest and most cultured region in the world -
fell so far behind. 
But historical curiosity is not always enough. Historians and other intel-
lectually minded individuals may appreciate the uncovering of historical 
connections as ends in themselves, but others consider historical research 
of this type worthwhile only if it sheds light on contemporary problems. 
This book should satisfy such a reader. It is first and foremost a book of 
economics. It uses economic theory to search for the general features of an 
economy that yield success under some conditions and stagnation under 
others. It uses Middle Eastern and Western European history as a testing 
ground for the theory. History provides one of the best grounds 
for economic hypotheses: what happened is behind us, and the long-run 
consequences are clear. This is certainly true of the long-run divergence 
between Western Europe and the Middle East. One set of economies was 
clearly much more successful than the other in the long run despite falling 
well behind early on. 
This book addresses this issue with a general economic argument. 
When economists say that an insight is "general;' they tend to mean that it 
applies to many situations, and the insight may predict different outcomes 
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depending on the parameters involved. 1his book aims to such a 
insight into how and why economic success and ., ... "-!:'."·'-'"-U'-'"-
over long periods. It should be obvious that this is not 
concern for the Middle East and Western the made in 
this book have implications for the difficult process of alleviating human 
suffering associated with economic underdevelopment around the world. 
After all, Western Europe was at one point an economic backwater, and the 
average wealth of medieval Europeans was lower than most of the 
parts of the world today. Understanding the mechanisms through which 
Western Europe escaped such poverty- and the Middle for the most 
did not - clearly has implications for possibilities and limits of 
economic growth in the developing world. 
The history of the long-run between Western Europe and the 
rest of the world is therefore important to understand not for the sake 
historical interest, but because it has real for how we view 
the world and how we can it. the economic framework out-
in Chapter 2, this book delves into the historical to out what 
worked in Western Europe and did not work in the Middle East. 
it never implies that merely what worked in Western ... ,,, .. ,. .... .,,,. 
into Middle East will solve all its economic the oppo-
site is true; the solutions that in Western Europe arose and evolved 
in a context. this context is essential for ..... 0~c1.1.HJ.0J..LJ..L•F, 
the limits of how previous can inform the 
Nor this book imply that the Middle East is helpless to its 
fortunes. In fact, one of the insights gathered from the book's 
framework is that there are many forks the path of a eco-
nomic, political, and institutional progression. Once a society takes one 
along the fork, it becomes more difficult over time to revert to the other 
side. new forks arise all the often for unanticipated or unforesee-
able reasons such as new technologies or natural How societies 
'""'C'...,"·'"',, to these opportunities can have consequences. But noth-
predetermines how a society will or when an will 
arise. History is not deterministic; we are not slaves to our historical and 
institutional past. 
This book also does not suggest that the type of economic success 
that Western Europe experienced could have only happened The 
twentieth-century successes of South Korea and Taiwan are 
evidence against such a claim. Instead, this book urges a more nuanced 
view of why long-run economic success occurs, for 
features linked time and again to economic success. 
10 Religion, and Riches 
Incentives 
Economists like to think in terms of incentives. This book is no different. At 
every historical turn, it asks the question: Why did the relevant parties act 
in the manner they did? The answer given in this book always boils down 
to: "They were incentivized to act in that manner:' Incentives come from a 
host of societal attributes: politics, religion, social norms, laws, and culture 
are just a few. The inquiry cannot stop there: simply noting the incentives 
that individuals face is the last step. It is critical to take a step back and 
ask: Why were those incentives there in the first place? Why do the incen-
tives people face in different places and at different times, and why 
do they change over time? Why do they sometimes not change over time? 
Thinking in terms incentives means ideas of 
run economic out of the window. Take, for the idea 
that the root of economic divergence between Middle East and Western 
Europe lies in the nature" of Islam. 111is is no straw man 
argument. A long tradition of Eurocentric explanations the divergence 
suggests that the or "mystical" nature of Islam ........ ..,,...,....,,.u 
curiosity and risk-taking, innovation, and 8 In 
this view, Islam is hostile to commerce and finance. Indeed, in 
varying times Muslim religious advocated laws that 
ae·ve1ovme~nt. such as on taking interest and 
of women, laws discouraging mass education, and 
an1t10uat:ea inheritance and partnership laws. So, at a mini-
between the presence of Islam and laws anti-
"'U'-'U'-''CU to economic J'i&>i;r.:>il .. 1ot"'\f-'YH>1'\t 
But correlation is not causation. A simple economic example illustrates 
.... L,_,, .............. u.~" relying on "inherent conservatism:' Consider 
elderly are less likely to use computing technolo-
L"''-JL.ta.i::; • .._ .. " are. On the surface, it may seem like older people are 
inr1en~nLLV more conservative - they sticking with writing letters over 
senarntQ: e-mails. however, is a too simplistic argument. Older people 
are less likely to use advanced computing, not because they prefer the old 
ways more than do, but because the costs and benefits of learn-
a new are different. It may in fact be less costly in terms 
for a seventy-year-old to become Internet proficient. Yet, a shorter 
life horizon for the elderly not only means that they will enjoy the fruits of 
learning to use Internet for a shorter period of time, but the opportunity 
costs associated with time taken to learn new technologies are much 
greater as well. since their friends are much less likely to be on 
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the Internet, the benefits associated with are also lower. 
Hence, older people take actions lead to more conservative out-
comes, but this is not a 
the incentive structure is such that have less incentive to 
J..LlC>~'-"W~) 
to economic Chapter 2 
a framework based on the incentives the relevant face in the bargain 
over laws and policies. It the conditions that incentivize these players 
laws and policies respond to economic environ-
these conditions are not pres-
a changing 
does not rely on some 
certain 
In the context of the 
cation of way of is that conservatism is an outcome to be 
it is not itself a cause of evi-
dence suggesting that Islamic thought became more 
conservative sometime around the turn of 
this does not mean we take the false connecting a con -
servative to economic C)La;:;:..i.ta.u•u.u • .1..u.a~-.. .... -~, 
to are some cultures are more conservative 
there incentives in East which 
outcomes. A 
ences and 
or IJVcLL~J.•vU..L• 
from where? 
correct UU•CC)L~V.LLO 
others and were 
Chapter 2 lays out the framework of the book. It focuses on 
in an economy who affect the set and policies: rulers 
and their One of its central ideas is that there are people or ornamza-
tions in due to their identity or access to resources, can help 
stay in power. I call these propagating agents. The framework 
focuses on two types of propagating coercive agents and ....... h,_~ ..... u,.~ 
ing agents. Coercive agents propagate through force - follow the 
because they face punishment - while legitimizing agents 
propagate through legitimacy - people follow the ruler because they believe 
he (or, much more rarely, she) has the to rule. Propagating 
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agents can provide immense benefits to the ruler, but they also come at a 
cost: the ruler gives them a seat at the bargaining table in return for their 
support. The laws and policies resulting from this bargain are reflective of 
the bargaining power of each player and their preferences. 
Religious legitimation is especially attractive to rulers because it is inex-
pensive. Thus, rulers rely on religious authorities when those authorities 
have the capacity to legitimize their rule. In such a world, rulers are loathe 
to update laws in response to changing economic circumstances if doing 
so would undermine the religious establishment. As a result, those with 
the most to gain from modernizing a society's laws and policies - produc-
ers, merchants, and commercial farmers - have little incentive to push for 
change. Not only are rulers unlikely to side against the religious establish-
ment, but such a request is also a sin. Consequently, laws and policies do 
not change in response to changes in the outside world, and the result is 
economic stagnation. This logic indicates that conservatism is a result of 
the incentives faced by the relevant players, not an ultimate cause of bad 
economic outcomes. 
The upshot is that differences in laws and policies across societies and 
over. time within societies are a result of differences in the identities of prop-
agatmg agents. These differences are themselves a result of differences in 
costs and benefits to rulers of using propagating agents. At one given 
point in time, a society's institutions impose these costs and benefits on rul-
ers. Institutions are those aspects of society that help form the "rules of the 
game" by which all players abide. All societies have numerous types of insti-
tuti~ns - ~~ligious, political, social, and economic - all of which help shape 
the game played between rulers and their propagating agents. 
Chapter 3 brings the framework to the economic histories of Western 
Europe and the Middle East, exploring the historical reasons that rule-
p.ropagating institutions were different in the two regions. It argues that the 
circumstances surrounding the births ofislam and Christianity had impor-
tant consequences for the manner in which rule was propagated. Islam was 
born ~n the ~eventh-century Arabian Peninsula, and it formed as the early 
Islamic empires were rapidly expanding. Many aspects of Islamic doctrine 
w~re .a response to this environment, including doctrine supporting a rul-
ers nght to rul~ as long as he acted "Islamic:' Christianity, on the other 
hand, was born in the Roman Empire, with its previously established, well-
functioning legal and political institutions. Early Christianity never formu-
lated a corpus of legal or political theory that came close to rivaling that of 
early Islam for the simple reason that early Christian thinkers did not need 
to do so. This is not to say that religious legitimacy was unimportant in 
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European history - it merely entails that Islam was more conducive to 
mizing rule than Christianity was, meaning that the benefits of ... ,..,.,,....,,,,," 
propagation were greater in the Middle East. than in Wes.te.rn .. 
framework therefore predicts all else bemg equal, rehg10us authorities 
should have had a greater seat at the bargaining table in the Middle East 
than in Western Europe. 
It matters who sat at the bargaining table two reasons: ( 1) doctrine 
exists in both Islam and Christianity that affects economic practices; (2) the 
interests of religious elites do not always align with the types of laws and 
policies that favor economic success. Chapter 4 brings to light ~ne con~e­
quence of this insight, overviewing the histo.ry of a~ ec~nomic doctnne 
common to Islam and Christianity: laws agamst takmg mterest on loans 
(usury). This chapter employs the framework to shed light on why usury 
doctrine diverged in the two religions. It highlights the different ways that 
political and religious authorities interacted in the t_w~ regions a~d how 
this in turn affected the willingness of rulers to permit mterest. This 
ter hardly claims that differences in interest laws were the reason Western 
._,."""'"'""'"'-n economies surpassed the Middle East Yet, it does show that 
these restrictions were not completely innocuous. The of financial 
instruments employed in the two reflected doctrinal differences 
and, more importantly, the lack institutions in the Middle East 
to the nineteenth century. 
5 analyzes the of the 
sheds on a historical 
in Western Europe after its invention by Johannes 
Ottomans prohibited its use for almost 250 years. The for the dif-
ferent reactions to the press is straightforward. The printing press threat-
ened the Ottoman religious establishment's monopoly on the transmission 
of knowledge - a key source of their in society - they there-
fore had incentive to encourage the sultan to prohibit it. The sultan ohllI2:e:a 
because religious authorities were important legitimizing agents, and per-
mitting the press would have undermined them. Meanwhile, Christian rel~ -
gious leaders were in no position to ask to block the press, and it 
consequently spread rapidly throughout Europe. . 
analyses of interest and printing restrictions suggest there is .L•'-'•-.LH.L.L"' 
inherent in Islam that fosters an environment supporting anti-commerce 
laws. In fact, early Islamic religious and doctrines were quite flex-
ible and possibly even growth promoting. Reinterpretation of religious law 
was frequent as demanded by economic and social conditions, and as a 
result the Middle East was an economic, technological, and cultural leader 
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for centuries after the founding of Islam. Many of the Islamic laws that 
eventually inhibited economic development were well suited to the needs 
of the early Islamic economy. as economic conditions advanced, the 
legitimizing relationship between political and religious authorities had an 
increasingly dampening effect on further economic development. Religious 
doctrines such as those banning interest or reproducing words and images, 
which were not a problem in the premodern economy, came to the fore as 
an impediment to overcome. 
The printing press was arguably the most important information tech-
nology of the last millennium, and Western European economies grew rap-
idly where it spread. But the indirect consequences of the spread of the 
press were even more important. Chapter 6 highlights one of these con-
sequences: the press facilitated the of Protestant Reformation. 
printing press permitted widespread, rapid dissent, allowing the 
Reformation to succeed where previous anti-Church movements failed. 
This chapter reports the results of empirical analyses that show that the 
Reformation was much more likely to take hold in towns with access to 
printed works. This is a classic case of a "fork" in a society's long-run insti-
tutional trajectory. Such an anticlerical movement, which was so dependent 
on the rapid flow of information, was much less likely to happen in the 
Ottoman Empire, where access to printed works was minimal. The lack of 
information technology in the Ottoman Empire capable of quickly trans-
mitting ideas allowed established interests to maintain their grip on power, 
permitting the status quo to hold for centuries. As a result, 
religious authorities remained powerful political forces in the Middle East 
for centuries after their influence waned in Western 
The remainder of the book argues why the Reformation was such an 
important event for the economic trajectory of Western Europe - and why 
a lack of a similar undermining of religious authority was important for the 
trajectory of Catholic Europe and the Muslim Middle East. primary 
insight is that the Reformation fundamentally transformed the manner in 
which rule was propagated. The already weak legitimizing capacity of reli-
gion eroded further in Protestant states following the Reformation, forc-
ing Protestant to change the agents that propagated their rule. The 
most common response was to seek propagation by the economic elites 
who served in parlfaments. By economic elite I simply mean those people 
primarily engaged in commerce: merchants, craftsmen, money changers, 
commercial farmers, and anyone engaged in either producing for mar-
ket or facilitating market transactions. The transition to propagation by the 
economic elite was an important development, because their preferences 
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tended to align more with those types of that also portend eco-
nomic success, such as secure property and public good 
Consequently, Protestant rulers more frequently enacted laws and ._,'-''''-'"'.l.'v" 
favoring long-run economic success than did Catholic or Muslim rulers. 
This is not to say that the economic elite were more "public 
than other types of propagating agents and therefore desired policies in the 
public interest due to altruistic motives. Quite the opposite, it suggests that 
the economic elite pursued their own interests, which just so happened to 
coincide with policies that benefited the broader economy. Nor is it to say 
that everything the economic elite desired was good for the economy; his-
tory is with examples of rent seeking by the economic elite. is 
also not to say that a political system run solely by the economic elite 
be a good an economy. It does imply, that a ""'""''··"'""'~· 
tern where the economic elite have a nontrivial seat at the bargaining 
enables better economic outcomes than one have no voice at all. 
Chaot:ers 7 and 8 dig into the relevant histories to support these asser-
tions. Chapter 7 overviews the economic and uv.uu· .... a..t 
ch2mg1es made in the two Protestant economies: England and the 
8 overviews the of one Catholic econ -
as well as Eastern economy 
·~~~·~+~.~ .. economies 
'-'UUH.IU'--J.""',u., Islam, and some 
-1-...... ,.-n.,,,.,,.,.,,1r 1-~'"'"''""A'""' accounts for the "little that hap-
.U .... J.V'-''"' and the rest of as well as the 
and the Middle East. It is not 
sufficient to say was that eventu-
led to economic success. modern economy was 
not a much an English and 
Dutch Phi~no1me:no1 framework "'r'"''""'"" 
which its 
where the modern economy 
was a very economy equilibrium by 
end of the sixteenth ,..,..,....,,-t-,,. .. ., - one that was more conducive to 
economic growth. 
This framework thus turns simplistic notions '"''-'JLJ.H'-""~''J.J.l", 
"Protestant ethic" to economic success on their head. 10 Max Weber 
[2002]) argued that Calvinist doctrine encouraged 
ers to show that were one of the "elect" by and 
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worldly success. The "spirit of capitalism" thus pervaded the tTcne~na1u 
countries and placed them on a different economic path. observation 
that inspired this hypothesis is valid: many of the Protestant nations had a 
head start on modern economic growth. But, while recognizing that there 
is a correlation between Protestantism and economic success, this book 
argues for a very different causal channel than one based on culture or reli-
gious tenets. It suggests that the changes in political economy brought on 
by the Reformation - specifically the replacement of the religious elite with 
the economic elite at the bargaining table - was the key feature connecting 
Protestantism to economic success. This of course does not mean that the 
modern economy had to emerge in Protestant northwestern Europe. It sim-
ply entails that if one living in 1600 had to choose which part of the world 
industrialization and the associated explosion of economic growth would 
commence 150 years hence, Protestant northwestern Europe would have 
been a good choice. 11 
Other Explanations 
The explanation proposed in this book for the "rise of the West" is far from 
the only one out there. The rise of the West is one of the big issues that 
economic historians tackle, and consequently have been many words 
dedicated to furthering our understanding of its causes. Many exist-
ing hypotheses nicely complement the one proposed in book. Such 
explanations focus on other aspects of the rise of the West or relative stag-
nation elsewhere, providing explanations reinforce the mechanisms 
highlighted in this book. There are also explanations that are dearly con-
tradictory to the ones proposed in this book. I also address these below and 
indicate why I believe my explanation succeeds where those fail. 
Complementary Hypotheses 
The explanations for the "rise of the West" most closely related to the one 
presented in this book are those proposed by Avner Greif, Douglass.North, 
and Timur Kuran. Greif and North both provide useful frameworks for 
understanding the economic implications of institutions. Greif shows in 
a series of articles and his book, Institutions and the Path to the Modern 
Economy, how decentralized institutions worked to facilitate trade in the 
medieval period in the absence of centralized political and legal institu-
tions. Greif focuses primarily on economic institutions that emerged out-
side of the state and how these institutions facilitated economic exchange. 
The focus of the present book is on a different slice of economic life: the 
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; ~ r•att1rnrt>C faced by the key Middle Eastern and Western political 
The institutional changes analyzed by Greif were necessary precur-
sors of the historical factors explored in this book. Greif's work therefore 
provides a necessary complement to my 
One set of institutional differences studied by Greif that deserve .._._,...,,_,H .... ·H 
attention are those related to family structure. The European family struc-
ture resulted from the policies of the medieval Church that ..... i..,...,~ ·~L 
certain practices in order to weaken kinship ties (adoption, polygamy, 
remarriage, consanguineous marriage). According to Jack Goody (1983), 
the Church imposed these policies in the that people would donate 
their property to the Church at their death rather than to their ldn.12 In 
contrast, kinship ties were much more in the Middle 
~,_.,.,,,,..,...,.,.,"...,""11c marriage was commonplace. (1994a, 2006a, 2006b) 
argues that, as a result, European culture was more "individualistic" than 
H'J.JU'-•.Lv Eastern culture, which was more v'-i'Jl.Lv---u 
institutions that created trust outside of the group, as the nuclear 
was too small of a unit to engender from 13 
rhT<lr\1"'CIO'C•f1 the Middle East when the scope of trade was J..LLUU ... ,.,,, .... , 
within the kin group could occur without institutional aeve1opme~m:. 
Howe'ver. impersonal exchange on a wide scale once late medieval 
l-in1·An,pcin communities established institutions that facilitated 
the kin group. are entirely consistent with ones pre-
sented in this book. For one, the same for why Islam 
may have been beneficial to economic in the context: it 
connected Muslims through the of umma, which views the entire 
Islamic community as one. And Greif's for the ultimate success 
of the economy nicely my explanation. kin 
ties may have ultimately discouraged in the 
but this alone does not why the economic elite were never able 
to a seat at the bargaining table. The argument presented in this book 
fills in this gap, arguing that the economic elite never had a at the bar-
,...,.,,,.., r, 0 table because Middle Eastern rulers were strong due to the 
legitimizing capacity of Islam, to exclude them. 
Another set of works from which the nrt>CPlr'lT 
and insight are Douglass North's works on especially his books 
Structure and Change in Economic History and Institutions, Institutional 
Change, and Economic Performance. A focus of North's works is 
connecting political institutions to the expansion of rights. The 
emergence of such institutions in northwestern Europe were undoubt-
edly important, and they play a key role in the theory laid out in this book. 
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North extended his contributions to this literature in seminal article with 
Barry Weingast (1989), which suggests that the imposition of institutional-
ized constraints on executive authority in England following the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 was the key turning point, since it gave an increased 
political voice to wealth-holders. North, John Wallis, and Weingast extend 
this argument even further in their book Violence and Social Orders, claim -
ing that opening access to impersonal and impartial legal and economic 
institutions is the key to economic growth. In their view, open access is 
important because it encourages a wider swath of the population to use 
resources efficiently. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) make 
a similar argument in their book Why Nations Fail, that govern-
ments that permit extraction are the primary historical to eco-
nomic growth. These are all consistent with the one in 
this book. By and this book takes the year 1600 as its stopping point. 
One implication of my argument is that by 1600, there were certain parts 
of Western Europe were primed for an economic takeoff in the spirit 
of what North and describe. Hence, this book merely pushes their 
arguments back a few centuries, noting why such events were more likely to 
happen in say, the Ottoman Empire. 
The employed in this book is similar to the impor-
tant works of Timur Kuran. Kuran, in a series of papers and his book, The 
argues that there were numerous of Islamic law 
stimulate commerce in the premodern economic environment 
stifled economic progress as the environment He employs a 
similar tactic to the one used in this book, searching for an explanation 
can both early Middle Eastern economies succeeded and 
Western Europe eventually pulled ahead. Kuran primarily focuses on 
demand - or thereof - for legal change in Middle Eastern history, 
focuses on its supply. 14 Our works are thus 
neicessar·y ciompie:mt:~ms to each other; it is impossible to fully understand 
a complete comprehension of the supply side, and 
and North's works, Kuran and I ask the same big 
parts of them. 
Jan Luiten van Zanden employs the insights of Greif, Kuran, North, and 
many others in his book, The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution. van 
Zanden argues that one specific phenomenon - the "European Marriage 
Pattern" to the institutional formation that took place in early 
and helped set it off from the rest of the world. 
Specifically, van suggests that the propensity of northwestern 
European men and women to get married later in life encouraged them to 
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acquire more human capital, which was an important determinant of how 
institutions evolved. 15 Like Greif, van Zanden argues for the importance of 
decentralized institutional developments in the economic rise in 
the late medieval period (950-1350). Without such developments, many 
of processes discussed in this book could not have occurred. Like the 
present book, van Zanden also stresses the of the printing press 
and the Reformation, although he is more concerned with their human cap-
ital consequences and I am more concerned their effects on politics. 
Another set of hypotheses focusing on political and legal institutions 
argues that :fiscal and legal capacity - the power to tax and provide law -
played an important role in the rise of the West. This in its recent 
form can be to Charles Tilly 1990 ), who argues that the need 
for mutual defense and war incentives for to invest in 
revenue Tilly's statement is "War made 
the state, the state made true that the 
of :fiscal, legal, and state role in the growth 
of states and economic fortunes. 17 one of this literature 
is that it assumes the existence of a ruler who can choose to expand tax 
collection efforts or legal jurisdiction into 
the ruler has the to do so in the first 
"'-'-'l-JLU.v•...,_) any 
of ruler is a to start in most ,_H..,LVJ. Jl'-'U-A settmLQS. 
an:unru~1u laid out in this book smrge:sts 
their to reap the Although I only 
indirectly discuss investments in fiscal capacity in relation to rule propa-
gation (in 7 and it follows that the two are intimately 
~ ~~ryd 
focuses on the fact that was into small 
states that were frequently at war, whereas much of the rest of the world 
was dominated large that less political competition. The 
main idea in this literature, formulated by Paul M. Kennedy (1987) in The 
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, is that the constant for 
in Europe created incentives to improve military technology at a different 
rate than the rest of the world, which in turn gave Europe the upper hand 
in colonizing starting in the century. A more version of 
this hypothesis, forward by Philip Hoffman (2015) in his book 
Did Europe Conquer the World?, argues that between...,,,..,..,..,...,,,....., 
rulers only led to massive improvements in military technology when 
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combined with gunpowder, which came to Europe in the late medieval 
period. 19 Yet, one of the key insights in the present book is that the Middle 
East ultimately suffered precisely because their rulers were strong: the 
strength of their rule, due in part to religious legitimation, permitted them 
to grow empires without having to negotiate with the economic elite. The 
opposite was the case in Europe, where rulers were relatively weak due in 
part to low levels of religious legitimation. This argument complements the 
fractionalization literature because it provides an explanation for Europe's 
fractionalization. 20 Indeed, it goes beyond this literature by providing an 
account for intra-European differences in long-run economic outcomes. 
The modern economy was born in northwestern Europe, not just Europe. 
This fact is difficult to account for in an argument based solely on European 
fractionalization. 
A different set of hypotheses focus on the economic effects of rhetoric, 
intellectualism, and the Enlightenment. A compelling example from this 
literature is Deirdre McCloskey's Bourgeois Dignity, which suggests that the 
way people talked mattered. In particular, a shift in language, particularly in 
England and the Netherlands, more favorable to commerce and trade was 
instrumental in changing mindsets and encouraging talented and wealthy 
individuals to pursue commercial activities previously considered base. Joel 
Mokyr (2002, 2009) presents a complementary argument, suggesting that 
new ways of thinking and acquiring knowledge, particularly in association 
with the seventeenth-eighteenth century the 
economic behavior of producers and entrepreneurs in favor 
ing toward more efficient techniques. Both McCloskey and Mokyr dearly 
point out important aspects of the growth of the modern economy; it is 
difficult to imagine a modern economy in which an inquisitive and experi-
mental impulse was lacking in business or those engaging in commerce 
were pariahs. it is unclear what the prime mover is in these arguments. 
Could it possibly be true that a change in attitudes toward merchants 
occurred without a concurrent rise in the power or wealth of these classes? 
Is it not possible that the Enlightenment and other intellectual movements 
were responses to economic or political conditions? The arguments made 
in the present book help shed light on these problems by providing insight 
into the conditions that made such movements possible in the first place. 
Contradictory Hypotheses 
The most important set of contradictory hypotheses to the one proposed 
in this book centers around differences in culture. I already stated the pri-
mary problems with explanations based on culture - they often confuse 
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correlation with causation, suggesting that a "conservative" culture is 
the cause of the problem when it is actually a result of forces also 
affecting economic and political differences. Of course, culture matters 
to economic outcomes. hypotheses of this ilk tend to treat culture as 
unchanging. An important example of such an argument yet comes 
from Max Weber (1922), who famously ascribed the relative economic 
retardation of the Middle East to the "conservative nature" of Islam. Such 
a claim was seconded in more recent expansive histories by David Landes 
(1998, ch. 24), Eric Jones (1981, pp. 179-84), and even Joel Mokyr (1990, 
pp. 205-6), who in a fantastic book on technology and economic develop-
ment suggests that a shift to a more conservative outlook contributed to 
the long-run technological backwardness of the Middle East.21 The 
book an alternative conservatism is not an iiii~~i ·~ii~ 
feature of a society, but an outcome based on a lack of incentive to ...,uv•.1..•;;'-'· 
_,.,,,,...,."'." Clark's meticulously researched A Farewell to Alms a 
r·hi-i-L>Y.C>fti- strand of cultural Clark offers the that noble 
middle-class values slowly throughout English society 
the late medieval and early modern because the rich had 
"""'r'"""'ri111·nr•n rates than did the poor, and this 
the world. As people with a more bourgeois .,~~-n~· .,~ .. i~ 
out all of the economy, virtues associated with '"'"..,, ... .,u.u.:u.J.J. 
with them, allowing England to escape the Malthusian of per-
sistent subsistence income. In Clark's institutions no role in the 
rise of modern wealth. It is a that has sparKe'.a 
,,,..,. .... ,..,., . .,.,...,_,,_ debate about the "big ow.:~snion 
others are poor.23 it does not address one 
of the argument: the onset of modern economic growth was a 
ern European phenomenon. Clark's applies to ..._,u;;.iu ........... 
the rest of Western Europe, and it cannot the clear differences that 
arose by 17 50 between the Ottoman and northwestern Europe, not 
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Another explanation, more prevalent in the popular press than in aca-
is that Western colonialism is the cause of Middle Eastern eco-
nomic stagnation and political violence. In view, the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century plundering of North and the Middle East 
European powers inhibited the region's economic development. The most 
popular variant of this argument is that the carving up of the Middle East 
under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 without regard to tribal, eth-
or religious identities set the stage for internal conflicts from which 
the region has yet to escape. 25 This is an attractive idea to those who want 
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to absolve Middle Eastern political, religious, and economic leaders 
contributing to economic stagnation. While it is certainly true that the 
European powers did not have the best interests of Middle Easterners at 
heart - and that many aspects of twentieth-century Middle Eastern politi-
cal economy have colonial roots - it is hard to see how colonialism is the 
root source of Middle Eastern problems. Such explanations raise a more 
important question than they answer (also noted by Timur Kuran): Why 
were Western European powers able to colonize the Middle East in the first 
place? Colonization cannot be the root cause of economic differences, but 
instead must be an outcome of other, more historically distant economic or 
political causes. 
Another hypothesis that cannot explain many of the phenomena dis-
cussed in this book is Jared Diamond's "geography hypothesis" forward 
in Guns, Germs, and Steel. Diamond claims that the shape ofland masses, the 
ability to domesticate certain animals, and crop endowment had numerous 
consequences for how societies formed over time. Likewise, Jeffrey Sachs 
( 2001) argues that disease environment, ability to produce food, and energy 
endowments help explain why tropical climates have performed worse than 
temperate ones. A related set of hypotheses are those of Stanley Engerman 
and Kenneth Sokoloff (1997, 2000), who argue that resource endowments 
helped shape the economic paths of different regions in the New World. If 
geography is the of long-run economic success, it is 
difficult to see some of the world could be so far ahead at one 
point in time and then fall so far behind later. all, geography is practi-
cally constant. The geography thesis therefore has difficulty answering the 
primary question posed in this book: Why was the Middle East so ahead 
of Western Europe for so long only to ultimately fall so far behind?26 
A final argument meriting discussion is the one proposed by Bernard 
Lewis late in his career in What Went Wrong? Lewis argues that the lack 
of separation of church and state in Islamic world had a det-
rimental effect on Islamic economies. This fact is also at the heart of the 
argument in the present book, although the conclusions drawn from it are 
very different than in Lewis. Lewis argues that there was never a separation 
of church and state in Islam due to the fact that Muhammad conquered 
his holy land in his lifetime and became the head of the first Muslim state. 
Consequently, the concept of "secularism" remained foreign and unthink-
able in the Islamic lands. Lewis goes on to argue that this meant that societal 
features associated with secularism in the West - civil society and repre-
sentative government - never evolved in the Islamic world. Lewis's argu-
ment is a bit too simplistic. Why should a concept be unthinkable for more 
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than one thousand years because it was not a of early Islamic 
doctrine? Both the religion of Islam and the structure of Middle 
Eastern states changed on numerous fronts in the last 1,400 years, especially 
in the first four Islamic centuries. There is nothing inherent to 
Islam that would forbid change in the manner that Lewis implies. The pres-
ent book provides an answer where Lewis is lacking one. Instead of simply 
assuming that differences in how rulers used Christianity and Islam were 
"built into" the system, it provides an explanation for why the legitimizing 
relationship between rulers and religious authorities diverged over time. 
Unlike Lewis, my explanation does not rely on a Eurocentric assumption of 
the "Orient" merely being stuck in its ways. I argue that where we 
do not see change it is not because of some inherent conservatism or alter-
"unthinkable;' but because it was in the interests of 
to maintain the status quo. 
a Caveat 
This book insight into the statement made in its subtitle: 
West rich and the Middle East did not. It tackles the of 
modern wealth came and West and 
wealth is a 
economists and economic historians. Political scientists are interested in the 
role that rulers and political institutions played in process that 
the modern economy. I also to but false claims 
about the connections between 
outcomes. To the extent that 
r\A"'"'' 1"''"' I avoid using eco-
"'""1.'"i-1"""' with words. 
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Whenever an economist writes for a it is difficult 
to avoid writing in a manner that prevents misinterpretation. This is 
even truer when writing on religion, a topic in which many people have 
preconceived notions on what they want the answer to be. I attempt to 
preempt any such misinterpretation throughout the book, wherever it 
is appropriate, and I re-address the major misconceptions of the argu-
ment in the concluding chapter. But there is one misconception worthy 
of addressing at the end of this introductory chapter. This is, namely, that 
this book is very much not a diatribe against religion. Nor is it a diatribe 
against Islam. It is true that this book seeks an explanation for why the 
Middle East fell behind Western Europe, and that it finds "getting reli-
gion out of politics" to have played a major role in this process. But there 
is almost nothing about Islam or Christianity per se that is at the root 
of these differences, save their capacity to legitimize rule. Nor is there 
anything specific to religion that is "bad" for economic outcomes: propa-
gation by any entity with interests not aligned with broader economic 
success will likely lead to laws and policies detrimental to long-run eco-
nomic fortunes. More importantly, while this book tackles a controver-
sial topic, it does so with no underlying agenda besides being a quality 
work of economics. It is not pro- or anti-Islam or pro- or anti-religion. 
It is simply an argument that uses economic logic to improve our under-
standing of the origins of the modern economy and why it 
and did not emerge - when and where it did. 
PART I 
PROPAGATION OF RULE: A OF 
ECONOMIC 
